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Be Careful What You Wish For: Popular Music in an
Age in Which “Information Wants to be Free”
Thom Gencarelli
Manhattan College

__________________________________________________________________
This article posits that the widespread adoption of music recording files as the
“preferred” form for the storage, retrieval, and dissemination of music is not, and
never has been driven by users/listeners; that this is an oversimplified
understanding of what has happened since roughly the turn of the century.
Instead, the article makes the historically-based argument that what has
happened has been driven by the industry side of the equation—even in the face
of what is, again, an oversimplified understanding: that the record industry has
undeniably suffered and contracted in size and revenue as a result of the digital
turn. The overarching significance of this argument is an attempt to bring some
much needed perspective to the many analyses of what has been going on in the
realm of popular music and the music industry, and to suggest what the
consequence of this state of affairs might mean for the future of both the music
and its industry.

__________________________________________________________________

Let’s be clear: The rush from tangible, hard copies of musical product—what the
recording industry refers to for copyright and licensing purposes as “mechanicals”— and
to digital files was not driven by the fact that this is what people, and young people in
particular, want. This is certainly what people nowadays seem to believe, especially young
people. As a result, though, the question that drives the present analysis is as follows: If
the quantum shift to digital music files for the storage, retrieval, and dissemination of the
record industry’s product is not driven by us, by whom—or by what—is it driven? And
with a nod to Harold Laswell’s famous axiom about human communication: with what
effect?
You certainly do not need to read any further to know that, some 30 years after its
introduction, the CD is an endangered species; that “vinyl” has become a status symbol, a
political stance, and something older bands and artists release as collectable merchandise
to separate their fans from more of their money; and that cassettes have been cast off as
the junk technology they always were. But CDs represent the last mechanical in a history
that spanned more than five decades of preeminence for 78 r.p.m. or “gramophone”
records, approximately threeandahalf decades for 45 r.p.m. and 33 1/3 r.p.m. records,
and two decades for audio cassette tapes—not to mention the marketing of less
widelyadopted and less successful media including eighttrack tapes, 1/4inch openreel
tapes, and [insert chuckle here] Sony’s minidiscs. And good riddance to all of this stuff,
right? I will admit to owning something in excess of 1,600 CDs, which along with my
collection of records and cassettes take up the greater part of a wall in my home. Why fill

Published by DOCS@RWU, 2014

1

Proceedings of the New York State Communication Association, Vol. 2013 [2014], Art. 4

our living space with such material stuff when a 64 gigabyte iPod Touch can hold the
equivalent of 1,400 CDs?
I could go into a diatribe based upon some other matters I have been thinking and writing
about lately, such as the fact that while that wall of music in my home takes up space,
removing such tangible goods from the marketplace will not save our
environment—regardless of all of their plastic, all of the petroleum it takes to produce this
plastic, and all of the space their discarded plastic, paper, and cardboard takes up in a
landfill. As James Carey (2008) made clear to us, all of our media of human
communication represent the transportation of information from one place to another. Add
to this lesson the first law of thermodynamics—that “energy under normal conditions
cannot be created nor destroyed, but simply transformed from one type of energy to
another”—and it becomes clearer still that it will always require energy to transport, store,
and retrieve media. In addition, we need even more, and more constant use of energy for
our forms of communication media that are digitally encoded. Does the term “server
farm” ring a bell—with all of the fossil fuel and electrical energy required to operate these
vast greenhouse complexes of servers and cool the heat they produce despite the northern
climes in which they tend to be built? A recent article posited that the information
technology sector accounts for roughly onetenth of our global energy demands (Can the
IT Sector’s Hunger…).
Regardless, what this has led me to is an examination of the reasons and the rationales for
our acceptance of this transition from mechanical, hardcopy music industry product to the
digital form—and which account, with respect to what we call the “diffusion of
innovation,” for both the speed and already almost universal breadth of this acceptance
and adoption. Of course, one can simply write this off to progress and the natural order of
things: that all things media are going digital and so music must necessarily go along for
the ride. Moreover, such examinations are typically driven by valueladen arguments
about the fact that the digitization of musical recordings has made downloading and
sharing digitallyflawless copies all but effortless, and that, as a result, people come up
with all manner of ways to justify behaviors that amount to the illegal obtaining, use, and
ownership of intellectual property. I will address this latter point, as it is necessary to the
argument I am making. However, I must emphasize that my primary purpose is to offer a
more historical take on what has happened, and to attempt to situate this history on a
continuum that suggests where we may be headed.
Sheehan, Tsao, and Yang (2010), in “Motivations for Gratifications of Digital Music
Piracy Among College Students,” point to the familiar litany of rationalizations. College
students and others convince themselves it is okay to “steal” music online, even though
they would not walk into a Gap clothing store and walk out with a pair of jeans they did
not pay for, because, since only a handful of people have ever been prosecuted or sued
for doing so, they are not worried about the consequences of their actions. At the same
time, they realize the costbenefit analysis: that illicit downloading means significant cost
savings. All it costs them is the price of their gadgets and their subscription fee for their
Internet access—which, at this juncture in time, also gives them access to most, if not all
of their media content (a point I will definitely return to in the course of this argument). I
would also add, however, that most young people do not pay for these things—their
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consumer electronics or the bill for their Internet and mobile data service—and thus often
hold the mistaken belief that they truly are obtaining content wholly free of charge.
In addition, Sheehan, Tsao, and Yang point to the relevance of risktaking behaviors
among young people, to their antiindustry bias, to their bias against the perceived greed of
already wealthy artists and groups, to their belief that the retail price of music is inflated
and already too high, and to their perception that “everybody does it” and that it is,
therefore, sociallyacceptable behavior.
To this, I would add the near collapse of the album form due to the rationalization that one
is held captive to paying a high price for the entire collection when only one or two songs
in the collection are worth listening to and owning. I would add a lack of media
education—media literacy awareness and training—including a lack of understanding of
how the media industry and, in particular, the music industry work. And I would add, not
former Grateful Dead lyricist John Perry Barlow’s coining of the mantra that “information
wants to be free,” but the reversal of this mantra—in recognition of the human agency
and individual responsibility at the base of all of our human affairs: that “everybody wants
something for free,” and that people will take it when they can get it, and when they can
get away with it.
Many of you who are interested to read this analysis in the first place are also probably
aware of the ruckus from two years ago, when Emily White, an intern at National Public
Radio’s All Songs Considered, published an article on the program’s website centering
upon her admission that, while her iTunes library contains a total of 11,000 songs, she had
purchased only 15 CDs in her lifetime. (Needless to say, she did not purchase the other
10,850 songs as singles or album downloads from iTunes.) One of the most significant
public and published responses to this admission—from a young woman who clearly, by
her choice of internship, has some interest in a career in the music industry—came from
David Lowery, a singer/songwriter and guitarist of some renown, on The Trichordist: a
blog “for those interested in contributing to the advancement of an Ethical Internet, and
the protection of Artists Rights in the Digital Age.”
Lowery pointed out the following set of figures:
Of the 75,000 albums released in 2010 only 2,000 sold more than 5,000 copies.
Only 1,000 sold more than 10,000 copies. Without going into details, 10,000
albums is about the point where independent artists begin to go into the black on
professional album production, marketing and promotion.
It is these figures that serve as the appropriate backdrop for this analysis. For while I
could present you with all manner of facts, numbers, and statistics about the music
industry from the perspectives of production, distribution, and consumption, it is this set of
figures—if wholly accurate—that presents to us, in the starkest of terms, the landscape
that is the contemporary industry. That is to say, the 75,000 CDs released two years ago
represent the output of four major record labels—now down to only three: Sony Music
Entertainment, the Warner Music Group (not owned by Time Warner), and the Universal
Music Group (not owned by Comcast, which owns NBCUniversal). It also represents
the output of any number of independent labels. And it represents truly independent
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releases: releases by individual groups and artists who may incorporate as a label or
simply include the name of a label on their cover in order to appear legitimate, but wherein
the “label” releases only their work or even just that one work.
The most significant figure Lowery points to, though, bears repeating: that in 2010 only
1,000 out of 75,000 CDs released—1.33 percent of all releases—sold at least 10,000
copies and broke even. No distinction is offered here with respect to classification or
genre of music. And of course it is easy to rationalize this in a kneejerk way and say to
yourself—as I am sure many of you are right now—“I am sure the reason most of it did
not sell is that it stinks.” And you would be validated in this assumption, given that across
all of our media arts, at least since the onset of the modern age, that proportion is about
right with respect to what is below average and not worth our attention, what is
demonstrably average, what is above average, and what is great and transcendent work.
I would add, however, another spin on this set of figures: Lowery says nothing about the
proportion of releases that did break even or did slightly better than this: that sold 10,000 to
50,000 copies—which is nowhere near enough in sales for the artist, or especially a group,
to make a living—versus those that attained sales of 100,000, 500,000, or even one million.
And to borrow from popular parlance that should help me to hit my point home here, I
would venture to say that 99 percent of these releases do not make enough money for the
artist or group or their label to make a living and survive: that it is really only the one
percent that is “making it” at this juncture in time. Furthermore, I would emphasize that
this one percent does not make it to this level—to the “top of the pops”—solely as the
result of some elusive intrinsic quality or value. Such artists, groups, and works also make
it because of the influence and various mechanisms and structures that are responsible for
placing them there.
But what does this say about, and what does it have to do with, the state of affairs that
brought us to this place in the first place? How did we get here?
I don’t think it is necessary for me to go all the way back to discuss the foundations of the
Internet in the U.S. government/military project known as DARPANET. It is, however,
important to note that the point at which the Internet became “cool” came when graduate
students and then undergraduate students, who were connected to the departments of
computer science and computer engineering that were awarded the grant money to
develop and build this network, began to use it. They were able to do so because of the
fact that it was constructed for use in the event of a cold warbased nuclear holocaust,
and that there was a lot of “down time”; that this holocaust never happened.
Thus, the Internet as we know it began as a groundswell, growing from the bottom up and
out of the interests of young people, rather than according to the topdown model of all
prior media and mass media in the electronic age. And it was as the result of this course
of events that many of us developed a kind of idealism about it. It was going to be
“democratic.” It was going to be used for our purposes, and toward our ends—good
purposes and ends—rather than toward the ends of the powers that created it or other
media and commercial powers that would exploit and corrupt it.
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It was during the heady times of this burgeoning idealism that computer scientists
developed perfectly average and even belowaverage platforms and protocols such as
.mp3 encoding and the MIDI (musical instrument digital interface) standard. (Jaron
Lanier, in his 2011 book You Are Not a Gadget, does a wonderful job of exposing MIDI
for what it is and for what it is not.) It was also during this time that the enthusiasts for
open code, railing against the proprietary, protective, and commerciallyoriented coding
practices of companies like Microsoft, with their average and belowaverage products,
began to conflate the idea that “information as code wants to be free” with the idea that
the information with which we interface also wants to be free. To say this another way:
Code is the underlying architecture we use to digitally enable and create text, graphics,
illustrations, photos, video, and sound. The rest of what we refer to as information is the
stuff we use, as media, at the surface level above the underlying infrastructure. It is what
is otherwise known as content.
Finally, it was during this time, in the late 1990s, that Shawn Fanning came up with the
original iteration of what came to be known as Napster: showing the world that the simple
little .mp3 file for a three to fourminute musical recording could easily be transmitted or
transferred via Internet protocol. This is the moment when the hacktivists, the open code
guys, and the “information wants to be free” idealists realized the pinnacle of their
technological prowess and where it meets with consequence.
The result, however, was the following: Shawn Fanning, John Fanning, and Sean Parker
taught the very industry their peertopeer network and its offshoots almost destroyed
how to do business in the digital age. Think of it this way: If we are going to continue to
provide an incentive for people who are musically and compositionally inclined to create
the intellectual property from which they can profit and try to make a living in an age after
Napster, we have no choice but to make obsolete the model that requires mechanicals to
be manufactured (with all of the raw materials, energy, and human power this
necessitates), be warehoused on the manufacturing and wholesale side, be shipped via
trucks to retailers where they are again warehoused, and then, in the case of
brickandmortar stores, be shipped yet a third time for pointofsale—or, in the case of an
Internet retailer like Amazon, be located in aircraft hangarsized warehouse, plucked from
a shelf by a runner with a forklift, carried back to the mailroom, packaged, stamped with
postage, and shipped for that third time via direct mail to the customer.
The new model is simply this: (1) Create a webpage for the product. (2) Create the
underlying architecture that connects this webpage to the consumer’s ability to pay via
credit card or PayPal. (3) Connect the two. In this way, the only costs of distribution are
the onetime work to program the page and connect it to the pay system, and running the
server. Everything else is pure profit. Of course energy is required to operate and
maintain the server. However, once the system is in place and operating, this is the only
constant cost incurred.
This is the reason we are here. It is a supplyside reason, not a demandside reason. It is
about cost savings for the manufacturer/producer and for the retailer.
But where does this leave us? I must admit that, on the one hand, there is very little
innovation going on in the realm of music creation and production at the moment.
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However, the system for promotion and distribution of music, as I have partly laid it out
here, creates something of a moebius loop with this state of affairs. That is to say, the
recording industry of the latter half of the 20th Century, for all of its corruption, greed, and
waste, all of its exploitation of artists and groups, all of its involvements with organized
crime, served a critical purpose. It was, and still is, comprised of people who care about
music as a significant art form within a world of commerce. It was not perfect. But
nothing is. And the fact is that a world of Pandoras, Spotifys, and iHeartRadios, of
algorithms helping people discover new music based on the idea of “sounds likes,” and of
individualized advertising appeals, is perhaps leading us further down the road that was
Adorno’s nightmare of sameness within our popular culture, and of us heading to the
trough of culture like cattle. However, to pursue this line of thinking about our future, at
this juncture, can only be my recommendation for future research on the subject.
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